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THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT: ACCURACY IS THE BEST POLICY 
N. David Bleisch * 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Under federal law, the Congressional Record should contain a 
"substantially verbatim report" of the legislative debates con-
ducted on the floors of Congress.! Due, however, to a privilege 
allowing members of Congress to revise and extend their remarks 
made in debate before they are published in the Congressional 
Record, the accuracy of the Record falls far short of this statutory 
requirement. 
President Johnson once stated: "There are few documents more 
important than the Congressional Record .... It is a document 
which affects our laws, our precedents and our judicial deci-
sions."2 The printed Record is used primarily for two purposes.3 
First, it is used by scholars and journalists as an historical ac-
count of congressional proceedings.4 Second, it is utilized as an 
important source for discerning congressional intent by both ad-
ministrative agencies and courts, the two major forums for the 
implementation of governmental policy.51t is this second function 
* Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. Solicita-
tions, Artieles and Book Review Editor, 1984-85. 
1 44 U.S.C. § 901 (1980) provides: "The Joint Committee on Printing shall control the 
arrangement and style of the Congressional Record, and while providing that it shall be 
substantially a verbatim report of proceedings, shall take all needed action for reduction 
of unnecessary bulk." 
2 Reprinted in 121 CONGo REC. 18,23861 (1975). Statement made by President Johnson 
while still the majority leader in the Senate. 
3 Fernsworth, Congressional Record: Dull, Useless Appendage of Congress, or Useful?, 
J.C. Press Chronicle, May 19, 1975, reprinted in 121 CONGo REC. 13, 16832 (1975). 
4Id. 
5 121 CONGo REC. 18, 23860 (1975) (remarks of Senator Packwood). See also Commen-
tary by Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) delivered on WA VA radio, reprinted in 122 
CONGo REC. 16, 19349 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Steiger). Goldwater continued: "In this 
341 
342 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS IVol. 12:341 
which is of primary importance to environmental practitioners 
since the search for legislative intent can make critical differences 
in how federal statutes governing areas of environmental concern 
will be developed and applied in practice after their legislative 
promulgation. Thus, substantive revisions made in the Con-
gressional Record may have substantial impact in the develop-
ment of environmental law. 
The Congressional Record is an official government publica-
tion.6 It contains the transcribed debateR of the House and the 
Senate, summaries of congressional committee activities, and an 
assortment of additional items submitted for publication by 
members of Congress. When Congress first began publishing the 
Record, members of Congress were permitted to revise and ex-
tend their speeches before they were printed.7 This revision privi-
lege was considered necessary in order to permit members of 
Congress to edit the verbatim transcripts to remove grammatical 
errors, inaccuracies and offensive content. 8 
The revision privilege continues today as a matter of con-
gressional tradition.9 However, the present privilege allows mem-
bers of Congress to make more than merely mechanical revisions. 
The privilege "permits the speaker to engage in wholesale addi-
tion to or deletion from his speech [before it is printed in the 
Record]. He may omit the speech in its entirety or even substitute 
a new text."10 
Thus, the revision privilege is sometimes used by members of 
Congress to make substantive alterations of their spoken remarks 
beyond those justified by the reasons for the privilege's exis-
tence.ll Many statements that bear directly on the issue of the 
intent of Congress in enacting a particular bill or referendum, 
although never heard on the floor of the House or Senate, may be 
regard, it is important that the Congressional Record does not present an inaccurate and 
misleading picture of our debates." 
6 Publication of the Congressional Record is governed by 44 U.S.C. §§ 901-910 (1982). 
7 See infra text and notes at notes 45-50, the section discussing the history of the 
revision privilege. The privilege dates back at least as far as to the publication of the 
Register of Debates between 1824-1837. Editors of the Register invited members of 
Congress to revise their speeches before they were published. McPherson, Reporting the 
Debates of Congress, 28 Q.J. OF SPEECH, 141, 144 n.22 (1942). 
8 See infra text and notes at notes 83-85. 
9 See infra text and note at note 45. 
10 Robinson, Are Speeches in Congress Reported Accurately?, 28 Q.J. OF SPEECH, 9, 10 
(1942). 
11 See infra text and notes at notes 67-82 for examples of abuse of the revision 
priVilege. 
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found in the Record. I2 As federal law governing environmental 
issues continues to be consumed by statutory regulations, legisla-
tive intent becomes more crucial in the law's implementation. 
These inserted statements may thus have a direct impact on how 
federal laws are applied in areas of environmental concern, as 
well as in every other controverted area of statutory law. 
This article discusses the role of the revision privilege in the 
publication of the Congressional Record, focusing on the potential 
dangers that arise in connection with the intentional and unin-
tentional misuse of the privilege as a means of obscuring accurate 
legislative history. The historical development of the Record is 
presented first, including a consideration of Congress' motives for 
assuming responsibility over publication of its own debates. Sec-
ond, the present day functions of the Record are discussed, focus-
ing on the Record's importance as an historical document and as a 
record of legislative intent. Third, the privilege allowing members 
of Congress to revise and extend their spoken remarks before 
they are printed in the Record is explained, followed by a presen-
tation of recent legislative attempts to limit the privilege's scope. 
Some examples of abuse of the privilege are then provided, fol-
lowed by an examination of how these abuses can thwart the 
purposes of the Congressional Record itself. This examination 
emphasizes the inadequacies of the justifications offered for the 
privilege's existence in light of the potential provided by the 
privilege for corruption of the legislative process and suggests 
that Congress should enact a stricter policy regarding revisions. 
The article then considers the merits of two constitutional argu-
ments, based upon the first amendment, which might be asserted 
in favor of requiring an accurate Congressional Record. Finally, a 
third argument is presented, asserting that the Congressional 
Record must contain an accurate account of the floor debates in 
order to comply with core first amendment principles. 
II. HISTORY OF THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD 
Both Houses of Congress, from their inceptions, have main-
tained official journals of their proceedings, as required by a 
provision in the United States ConstitutionY Originally, the 
12 121 CONGo REC. 18, 22919 (1975) (testimony of Rep. James G. O'Hara). 
13 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3, which provides: "Each House shall keep a journal of its 
proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may in 
their judgement require secrecy." The Supreme Court has interpreted the purpose of 
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official journals contained brief accounts of congressional pro-
ceedings as well as a tally of votes taken on legislative bills. It was 
not until the proceedings of the House of Representatives were 
opened to reporters in 1789,14 however, that any attempt was 
made to keep verbatim transcripts of the floor debates. 15 
In 1833, with the founding of a private publication entitled the 
Congressional Globe, the proceedings of both the House and Sen-
ate were reported in a single document for the first time. 16 The 
Globe, however, did not provide a very accurate account of the 
floor debates. The Globe's inaccuracy was a result of several fac-
tors. Most notably, reporters for the Globe recorded the debates 
using either longhand or a personal form of shorthand-methods 
which resulted in frequent errors. 17 In addition, the Globe's editors 
were prone to dedicate relatively more space and accuracy to 
certain political factions than to others. 18 
These shortcomings in the Globe's accuracy prompted several 
members of Congress to question the credibility of the Con-
gressional Globe and to demand that the Globe provide a more 
accurate account of the floor debates. 19 The Senate in 1848 and the 
this clause as: "insur(ing] publicity to the proceedings of the legislature, and a corre-
spondent responsibility of the members to their respective constituents." Field v. Clark, 
143 U.S. 649, 670-71 (1892). 
14 Reporters were allowed into the House beginning April 8, 1789 and into the Senate 
beginning December 9, 1795. McPherson, supra note 7, at 144. 
15 The Annals of Congress , although covering the period from March 3, 1789 to May 27, 
1824, before the publication of the Globe, were actually published after the Globe began 
publication. The works were collected by Editors Gales and Seaton and were not pub-
lished until 1834. McPherson, supra note 7, at 144. 
The chronological record of congressional debates is printed in the following docu-
ments: 
Annals of Congress 







16 The Congressional Globe was an independent publication begun by editors Blair and 
Rives after their defeat as Printers to Congress in 1833. McPherson, supra note 7, at 145. 
Daily Globe (Wash., D.C.) Aug. 5, 1852. 
17 McPherson, supra note 7, at 146. 
18 Id. at 145. The Globe, for example, usually gave more space to the supporters of 
President Jackson. Id. at 145 n.33. 
19 Id. at 145. The attack was led by Reps. Edward Stanley, William J. Graves, William 
K. Bond, and Waddy Thompson in the House and by Sens. Robert J. Walker and Richard 
H. Bayard in the Senate. Id. Thompson referred to the reporters as "habitual falsifiers of 
the debates." Id. at 145-46,citing CONGo GLOBE, 26th Cong., 1st Sess., 297-98; Daily Globe, 
Apr. 1, 1840. The reporters responded by simply ignoring Thompson's participation in the 
debates until he apologized. 
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House in 1850 decided to finance independent reporters to record 
the debates and to supply the Globe with a copy of the debates for 
publication.20 This decision elevated the Globe to semi-official 
status and initiated the temporary existence of verbatim reports 
of congressional proceedings.21 
Verbatim reporting of the debates was short lived. In 1851, the 
editors of the Globe announced that thereafter only a "brief or 
sketch of the debates" would be published in the main body of the 
Globe.22 Only those speeches that members felt were important 
enough to write out at length and submit to the Globe's editors 
were still published verbatim.23 Pressed by the rapidly increasing 
volume of debates held during the Civil War and spurred by the 
continued dissatisfaction of congressional members with the ac-
curacy of reporting in the Globe, Congress, on April 2, 1872, de-
cided to assume full responsibility for the reporting and publica-
tion of its own debates.24 
The Congressional Record was the document resulting from 
Congress' decision to report its own debates. The Government 
Printing Office published the first issue of the Congressional Rec-
ord on March 5, 1873.25 Except for the inclusion of a daily digest 
since the 80th Congress,26 the Record's format has remained vir-
tually unchanged since its original publication. Each issue of the 
Record reports the previous day's events.27 
20 Contracts were made with the editors of the National Intelligencer and the Union to 
furnish the editors of the Congressional Globe with a copy of the debates for publication. 
McPherson, supra note 7, at 146. CONGo GLOBE, 29th Cong., 2d Sess., 571. 
21 McPherson, supra note 7, at 146-47. The practicality of verbatim recording was 
assisted by the use of phonetic shorthand which was introduced to Congress by recorder 
Isaac Pittman. Id. citing Evening Star (Wash., D.C.) Feb. 29, 1896. 
22 Daily Globe, (Wash., D.C.) Dec. 6, 1851. 
23 Id. These speeches were printed in the Globe's Appendix. 
24 H.R. Rep. No. 23, 42nd Cong., CONGo GLOBE, 42 Cong., 2d Sess. 1413, 1776-82. Daily 
Globe, (Wash., D.C.) March 3, 5, 1872. 
25 Authorized by United States Statutes at Large XVII, 47. 
26 M. COHEN & R. BERRING, How To FIND THE LAW (8th ed. 1983). 
27 44 U.S.C. § 903 (1980) reads, in part: "The public proceedings of each House of 
Congress, as reported by the Official Reporters thereof, shall be printed in the Con-
gressional Record . ... " 
The Record is divided into three distinct sections entitled "Senate," "House," (the 
order of which alternates daily) and "Extension of Remarks." The sections of the Record 
contain distinguishable subcategories. The Senate section includes morning business, 
executive session, legislative session, and the introduction of bills and resolutions. The 
House section includes one minute speeches, legislative session, and special orders. The 
"Extension of Remarks" section harbors those insertions unsuitable for printing within 
the body of the Record. 
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III. FUNCTIONS OF THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD 
The Congressional Record is generally considered to serve two 
basic purposes.28 First, it preserves an historical record of the 
legislative debates.29 Historians and students alike consult the 
Record to gain an appreciation of the congressional proceedings 
surrounding politically significant events. Second, it is used to 
determine the purposes that Congress intended to promote when 
Congress enacted particular federal statutes.30 The Record is 
availed as legislative history both by administrative agencies 
when implementing the law and by courts when interpreting it.3! 
When a new statute is enacted by Congress, federal agencies 
whose duties are affected by the new statute are often required to 
draft regulations to provide guidelines for the statute's practical 
enforcement. These agencies frequently look to the Congressional 
Record for guidance when drafting regulations to accompany 
congressionally mandated programs.32 The Record becomes par-
ticularly important when the bill from which the statute was 
derived and the reports of the congressional committees which 
considered the merits of the bill leave doubt as to Congress' 
intent.33 
While courts rely on legislative history only when a statute is 
ambiguous as applied to the particular set of facts under consid-
eration,34 most laws are general by their very nature since Con-
gress cannot foresee the many particular circumstances under 
which the laws will be applied.35 When the courts need to interpret 
a federal statute without the benefit of legal precedent, they rely 
primarily on four sources: the language of the statute itself; any 
federal regulations based on the statute; and, when they exist, 
both the committee reports on the statute and the debates on the 
statute which appear in the Congressional Record.36 
28 See supra note 3. 
29 Id. 
30 See supra note 5. 
31 Id. 
32 124 CONGo REC. 4, 5110 (1978)(remarks of Rep. Steiger). 
33 121 CONGo REC. 16, 21335 (1975)(remarks of Rep. R. Kasten, Jr.). 
34 Letter from Richard A. Givens, Chairman of the Committee on Federal Legisiation, 
N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n, to Rep. John J. Moakley (D-Mass.), Dec. 8, 1977, reprinted in 
124 CONGo REC. 1, 207 (1978). 
35 Id. 
36 121 CONGo REC. 18,22919 (testimony of James G. O'Hara; Mr. O'Hara did not mention 
federal regulations). Most laws are passed without being debated. Usually onl~ those 
bills that are of great public interest are discussed on the floors of Congress. 
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The Supreme Court has stated that the remarks of a single 
legislator, even those of a sponsor of a bill, are not controlling in 
analyzing legislative history.37 Generally, however, the courts do 
give some weight to such remarks when the stated intention of 
the legislator is to clarify or explain the bill's purpose.38 The 
Supreme Court cites the Congressional Record regularly.39 In the 
three year period between January 1, 1981 and January 1, 1984, 
for example, the Court cited the Record in 151 opinions.40 
It should be noted that legislative intent is an amorphous con-
cept. It cannot be presumed that individual members of Congress 
maintain a single intent on each issue that passes before them. 
Nevertheless, legislative histories are compiled in order to derive 
some indication of the purposes meant to be promoted by the 
passage of particular statutes.41 These compilations include 
comparisons of the final language of the statute to the original 
bill, the committee reports which usually set forth the rationale 
behind the committees' recommendations to accept or reject the 
bill, and the debates of the bill on the floors of the House or the 
Senate.42 To the extent that remarks made in the legislative 
debates reflect upon the purposes of the statute's enactment, 
37 Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 311 (1979); S. & E. Contractors, Inc. v. United 
States, 406 U.S. 1, 13 n.9 (1971). The statement of an opponent to a bill should receive 
little weight in construing legislative history. Hotzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1304, 
1313 n.13 (1975); Mastro Plastics Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 350 U.S. 270, 288 (1956). 
See also Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 396 (1951)(Jackson, 
J., concurring). Justice Jackson warned that to select phrases from the Record is to sit as 
Congress in determining the intent of a statute. Nor does legislative history represent 
the opinions of the President. "It is not to be supposed that, in signing a bill, the 
President endorses the whole Congressional Record." ld. 
Also see the remarks of Representative Steiger: "My chief concern is that we may see 
a return of the practice whereby the judicial branch of our government ignores the 
record of debate when considering the intent of Congress." 121 CONGo REC. 20, 26633 
(1975). 
38 J. JACOBSTEIN & R. MERSKY, FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL RESEARCH (2d ed. 1981). 
39 Fernsworth, supra note 3. See, for example, the listed examples of use of con-
gressional debate by the Supreme Court in 121 CONGo REC. 16, 21335 (1975). 
40 LEXIS search using the keywords "Congressional Record" and "Cong. Rec." and 
restricted between dates 111181 and 1/1/84. Search conducted on November 7,1984. The 
circuit courts for the same period cited the Record as authority in a total of 888 cases. 
41 See JACOBSTEIN, supra note 38, at 164. ("[T]he use of legislative histories is a very 
essential technique of contemporary litigation.") 
42 ld. at 164-66. "The discussion of a pending bill by members of Congress [as reported 
in the Congressional Record] may be useful in determining congressional intent." ld. at 
181. Committee hearings are technically not a part of legislative history since they 
contain the opinions of non-legislators rather than congressional deliberations of the bill 
under consideration. ld. at 165. Committee reports are usually considered to be the most 
important indicators of legislative intent. ld. 
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such remarks may play an integral part in establishing legislative 
intent.43 
Considering the uses of the Congressional Record, it appears 
important that the Record present an accurate report of the floor 
debates. As explained in the following sections, however, the Rec-
ord often presents a report that differs substantially from actual 
congressional proceedings. 
IV. THE REVISION PRIVll.,EGE 
The revision privilege permits members of Congress to edit the 
substantive content of the remarks they make in debate before 
their remarks are printed in the Congressional Record. Although 
responsible use of this privilege addresses valid concerns, some 
use of the revision privilege exceeds the justification for its exis-
tence. Indeed, some drastic abuses of the revision privilege can 
lead to corruption of the legislative process and can thwart the 
utility of the Congressional Record itself. 
A. The Mechanics of the Privilege 
The debates in the House and Senate are recorded verbatim by 
Congress' official shorthand reporters. The reporters, working in 
brief shifts to insure accuracy, record every word spoken on the 
floor. The shorthand verbatim reports are quickly transcribed 
into typed copies. These copies are usually made available to 
members of Congress to proofread within an hour after the 
member speaks on the floor in order that members of Congress 
may revise and extend their own remarks before the midnight 
deadline for publication in the next day's Congressional Record.44 
The revision privilege is not specifically authorized by statute 
43 "Arguments for and against amendments and passage are made, explanations of 
unclear or controversial provisions are offered, and much of the business of the legisla-
tive process is revealed in floor discussion." COHEN & BERRING, supra note 26, at 302. 
44 Mantel, The Congressional Record: Fact or Fiction of the Legislative Process, THE W. 
POUTICAL QUARTERLY 981, 982-83 (Dec. 1959). 
The "Extension of Remarks" section contains revisions that were intended for the 
body of the Record but which were returned after the midnight deadline for inclusion in 
the next day's Record. The daily Congressional Records are compiled every thirty days 
for printing and binding in the permanent Congressional Record. "Revisions that failed 
to get in under the wire can be made, as a rule, for the bound volume published at the 
end of the session. Thus it is possible to read two versions of the Congressional Record, 
neither of them accurate." Berdiner, The Wishful Transcript, ATL. MONTHLY (July 1978) 
reprinted in 124 CONGo REC. 15, 20323 (1978). 
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or regulation. Rather, it is a matter of congressional tradition.45 
Under the original revision privilege, the degree of revision that 
could be made by a member of Congress was virtually unlimited.46 
Utilizifl.g the revision privilege, a member of Congress could add 
an entire speech to the Record and thereby give the appearance 
that she had actually delivered the inserted speech on the floor of 
Congress. A 1977 study conducted by the Government Printing 
Office concluded that the Record contained up to seventy percent 
extraneous material never spoken on the floor.47 A member of 
Congress could alter any portion of her speech before it was 
printed in the Record.48 She could delete passages, rearrange 
sentences and add whole paragraphs to her speech with no indi-
cation that any alteration had been made.49 She could even alter 
45 The historical origins of the revision privilege are apparently rooted in the granting 
of permission to congressional members to extend their remarks after an announcement 
by the editors of the Congressional Globe in 1851 that the Globe would thereafter carry 
only a sketch of the debates. See supra text and notes at notes 22-23. The revision 
privilege provided members of Congress with a vehicle to present portions of the floor 
debates that they felt to be of particular public interest as well as an opportunity to 
correct any errors in recording made by the reporters of the debate. 
46 C. CLAPP, THE CONGRESSMAN, HIS WORK AS HE SEES IT (1964), reprinted in 121 
CONGo REC. 17, 21963 (1975). 
47 123 CONGo REC. 4, 5113 (1977). In a comparison of 23 countries with a legislative body 
comparable to our own, a 1973 report by the Joint Committee on Printing found that the 
Congressional Record possessed "the widest degree of permissiveness in incorporating 
unspoken material." 123 CONGo REC. 3, 3051 (1977). 
According to the Congressional Quarterly, a non-governmental publication, the Con-
gressional Record "records not only what was said in Congress, but also what members 
want people to believe they would have said had they been there. It's hard to tell one 
from the other." Reprinted in 121 CONGo REC. 26, 33745 (1975)(remarks of Rep. Hubbard, 
Jr.). 
For a tragic example, see the Oct. 18, 1972 speech of Representative Boggs wishing 
everyone a happy Christmas recess. Boggs was killed in an airplane crash two days 
before he supposedly delivered the speech. 121 CONGo REC. 94, 24454 (1975). 
See also remarks of Representative Steiger, 121 CONGo REC. 17,22711 (1975)("It is now 
virtually second nature for a Senator or Representative to revise remarks which he 
uttered on the floor."). 
Much of what is printed in the Record is undoubtedly prompted by the franking law, 44 
U.S.C. § 907 (1982). 129 CONGo REC. S12403 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1983). A member may have 
portions of the Record copied and sent to constituents as franked mail. Thus, a member 
may insert a statement into the Record asserting a favorable position on a popular issue, 
and then mail copies of his statement to the public at little or no cost. 121 CONGo REC. 17, 
21965 (1975). 
48 Senator Neuberger, The Congressional Record Is Not A Record, N. Y. Times, Apr. 20, 
1958 reprinted ill 121 CONGo REC. 15, 22711 (1975)("If this is not rewriting contemporary 
history, then what is it?"). 
49 CLAPP, supra note 46. A study by J. A. Hendrix utilizing a side-by-side comparison of 
excerpts from a congressional speech reported in the New York Times and the revised 
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the Record to reflect the exact opposite of what she actually said 
in debate.50 
B. Attempts To Limit the Scope of the Privilege -
Many attempts have been made over the years by some mem-
bers of Congress to restrict the use of the revision privilege in 
order to limit the material printed in the Cong'ressional Record to 
an accurate account of the floor proceedings. In 1958, for example, 
Senator Richard L. Neuberger (D-Ore.) introduced a resolution 
declaring that "no changes of a substantive nature" would be 
allowed in a Senator's speech as recorded by the official reporters 
of the debatesY The resolution was defeated.52 In 1973, a similar 
resolution was offered by Representative Pierre S. duPont, IV 
(R-De1.).53 Representative duPont contended that members of the 
House should be permitted to revise grammatical and typo-
graphical errors in their recorded remarks, but they should not be 
allowed to alter the "scope, intent and substance" of their spoken 
remarks. 54 This resolution was also defeated.55 Similar resolutions 
version reported in the Congressional Record led Hendrix to conclude that the Record is 
an "accurate transcript." Hendrix, A New Look at Textual Authenticity ojSpeeches in the 
Congressional Record, 31 S. SPEECH J. 153, 159 (1965). Hendrix's conclusion was based on 
his observation that "the similarities [between the two versions] ... far outweigh the 
differences." [d. However, a single sample is an insufficient data base from which to 
extrapolate generalizations about the accuracy of the Record as a whole. While "[g]ener-
ally the content [of the Record] is pretty close to the reality ... on occasion it may bear 
little resemblance to what was actually said." 121 CONGo REC. 19, 25012 (1975). Those 
occasional changes of a substantive nature have prompted the present concern about 
the revision privilege. 
50 See, e.g., 121 CONGo REC. 16, 20874-75 (1975). 
51 121 CONGo REC. 18, 23860 (1975). Senator Neuberger asserted: "The very masthead 
'Congressional Record' ought to assure rigid fidelity to truth and circumstances." [d. 
52 [d. 
53 119 CONGo REC. 1,471 (1973). The resolution tendered by duPont is representative of 
many of the other resolutions offered to restrict the scope of the revision privilege. 
duPont's resolution, in relevant part, provided as follows: 
1. The body of the Congressional Record for the House of Representatives shall 
contain an accurate and verbatim account of remarks actually delivered on the 
floor of the House. 
2. . .. revisions shall be limited to the correction of grammatical and typographi-
cal errors; and in no event shall such corrections make any change in the 
meaning, content or substance of those remarks. 
3. Members shall be entitled to extend such remarks by the additions of state-
ments ... [etc., which] shall be printed in a type face distinctively different from 
that used for verbatim remarks. 
54 [d. 
55 [d. 
1985] CONGRESSIONAL RECORD 351 
were offered and defeated in 1975 by Representative Robert W. 
Kasten, Jr. (R-Wis.)56 and by Senator Robert Packwood (R-Ore.).57 
In 1978, a resolution to limit the use of the revision privilege 
was finally passed. This resolution, championed by Senator 
Packwood in the Senate and Representative William Steiger (R-
Wis.) in the House, was less stringent than its predecessors. 58 The 
resolution merely required that all speeches that were wholly 
inserted in the Record without being delivered on the floor must 
be marked in the Record by the use of circular symbols called 
bullets. The rule for publication that resulted from this resolution 
describes the method by which the bullet symbols are to be used: 
"Only as an aid in distinguishing the manner of delivery, and in 
order to contribute to the historical accuracy of the Record, 
statements or insertions where no part of them was spoken will be 
preceded and followed by a 'bullet' symbol, i.e., _."59 
Although use of the bullets provides some assistance in distin-
guishing spoken remarks from unspoken remarks in the Record, 
the system is by no means perfect. The italicized portion of the 
bulleting rule highlights a "serious 100phole"60 in the bulleting 
requirement. Only those speeches which are wholly inserted in 
the Record are so designated by bullets.61 If a member speaks as 
little as one sentence on the floor, the entire remainder of his 
speech, even if never delivered on the floor, will be printed in the 
Record without the bullet symbols.62 A member of Congress may 
56 121 CONGo REC. 16, 21334 (1975). Mr. Kasten was motivated by his concern over the 
inaccuracy of the Record considering its use by federal agencies and the courts in 
construing legislative intent. "Presently," he wrote, "the Congressional Record is a 
disgrace as an accurate historical and official record. It contains utterances never 
uttered and statements never stated." [d. 
57 121 CONGo REC. 18, 23860 (1975). Packwood was motivated by concerns over the 
interpretation of legislative intent similar to those of Kasten, supra note 56. 
58 See 124 CONGo REC. 4, 5207-09 for a compilation of correspondence involved in the 
development of this resolution. 
59 The Laws and Rules for Publication of the Congressional Record (emphasis added). 
These rules are printed periodically in the back of the Record. 
60 124 CONGo REC. 4, 5113 (1978). 
61 See the Notice of Amendment announcing the implementation of the bulleting 
requirement. The Notice of Amendment was printed in the Record many times between 
the resolution's passage and the implementation of the bulleting requirement. See, e.g., 
124 CONGo REC. 3, 3676 (1978). The Notice read, in part, as follows: "If a member verbally 
delivers thefirst portion of the statement (such as the first sentence or paragraph), then 
the entire statement will appear without the 'bullet' symbol." (emphasis in original). 
62 See remarks of bulleting proponent, Rep. William Steiger, 124 CONGo REC. 4 '(1978). 
("The action is a good first step, but it is only a first step .... Bulleting of wholly inserted 
remarks is excellent, but we have not gone far enough when a Member can, by speaking 
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still alter the "scope, intent and substance"63 of a delivered speech 
before it is printed in the Record without indicating that changes 
have been made.64 Thus, few of the inaccuracies in the Con-
gressional Record attributable to the original revision privilege 
have been removed by enactment of the bulleting requirement. 
According to Sen. Charles R. Mathias (R-Md.), former chairman 
of the Joint Committee on Printing, some members of Congress 
have found a way to avoid the bulleting requirement altogether. 
They simply go to the official reporter of the debates and request 
that the bullets not be used to mark their inserted statements.6.'i 
The bulleting requirement may thus be circumvented by a simple 
request.66 
V. ABUSE OF THE REVISION PRIVILEGE 
The ability of members of Congress to go back and make sub-
stantive alterations in the texts of their remarks before they are 
printed in the Congressional Record provides a substantial vehi-
cle for distortion of the legislative process. The potential for abuse 
spans from attempts to slip legislation through Congress by mak-
ing it appear as if the item oflegislation was explained in the floor 
debates to attempts to influence the administration and interpre-
tation of laws by the insertion of remarks into the Record bearing 
on the issue of legislative intent. 
as little as one sentence, make two pages of inserted material appear to have been 
delivered.") 
The inadequacy of the bulleting requirement was pointedly demonstrated in a speech 
offered by Rep. Lawrence Coughlin (R-Penn.) after the adoption of the bulleting re-
quirement. 124 CONGo REG. 4, 5262 (1978). After delivering the first paragraph of his 
speech criticizing the inadequacy of the bulleting requirement on the House floor, Mr. 
Coughlin announced, "[t]he remainder of my speech will be submitted, but will appear in 
the Record as if I stood before you and continued to speak [i.e., without bullets]." [d. 
Coughlin continued: "The Congressional Record was created to serve as an accurate 
historical and legal document. Unfortunately, it seems to have deteriorated into an 
inaccurate and often misleading journal." [d. 
See also 124 CONGo REG. 6, 7294 (1978) in which Rep. Steven D. Symms (R-Idaho) 
commented in response to an apparent exercise of this "loophole." Referring to com-
ments printed in the Record by another Congressman, Symms said: "Either my col-
league has a tongue which is faster than a speeding bullet, or we should consider putting 
some bullets around his extraneous remarks." [d. 
63 See supra text at note 54. 
64 Alterations in delivered speeches do not have to be marked with bullets. Only wholly 
inserted statements must be marked. See supra text and note at note 62. 
65 129 CONGo REG. S12402-03 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1983)(statement of Sen. Mathias). 
1985] CONGRESSIONAL RECORD 353 
A. Examples Of Abuse 
Examples of abuse of the revision privilege are hard to uncover. 
The verbatim transcripts of the debates are classified as "non-
public"67 and, accordingly, are not available for public scrutiny.68 
Nevertheless, the few examples of distortion which have surfaced 
illustrate how the revision privilege affects the interpretation and 
application of federal law. 
In 1981, Representative Daniel Rostenkowski (D-Ill.), Chairman 
of the Committee on Ways and Means, reintroduced a bill de-
signed to compensate black lung sufferers.69 When explaining the 
bill on the floor of the House, Representative Rostenkowski failed 
to mention an amendment added to the bill that morning by 
Senator Robert Dole (R-Kan.), which authorized the Internal 
Revenue Service to approve special deductions for members of 
Congress including a 19,000 dollar deduction for their Washington 
living expenses. 
Nevertheless, the next day's Congressional Record credits Rep-
resentative Rostenkowski with two paragraphs discussing the 
proposal that conclude with the following sentence: "The amend-
ment requires the Treasury Department to determine an appro-
priate amount which Members [of Congress] may deduct, without 
substantiation, for away-from-home business expenses."70 Had 
Rostenkowski's statement actually been delivered on the floor, 
the amendment would probably never have been passed. When 
the amendment was discovered, it was quickly repealed. 
In 1979, Representative John J. Duncan (R-Tenn.) pushed 
through the House an amendment to a bill. The amendment was 
designed to immunize the Tellico Dam project in Tennessee from 
a number of federal environmental laws of which the project was 
in violation.71 Duncan never read or discussed this amendment on 
the House floor. Nevertheless, the following day's Record credits 
Duncan with having explained the amendment in full. Duncan 
reportedly said: "The purpose of my amendment is to establish in 
66 Id. 
67 Miller, Congress' Lticense To Ltie, READER'S DIG. 72, 76 (Feb. 1983). 
68 Id. at 72. 
69 127 CONGo REC. H9792 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1981). 
70 Id. 
71 According to the Tennessee Valley Authority, the project was in conflict with the 
Rivers and Harbors Act, the Clean Air Act, the National Historic Preservation Act, and 
the Endangered Species Act of 1973. Flyer published by "Concerned Tennesseans," 
entitled An Unprecedented Violation of Congressional Procedures. 
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law the Congress' desire to see that the Tellico Dam and Reser-
voir is completed and used as designed .... My amendment would 
provide in legislation, what we in Congress intended as far as the 
status of the project is concerned ... that the Congress intends for 
this project to be 100 percent complete and used as designed."72 If 
this abuse had not been discovered, anyone relying on the Record 
to establish the legislative intent in enacting Duncan's amend-
ment would have concluded that Congress intended for the Tel-
lico Dam to be completed regardless of how many environmental 
statutes it violated. 
In 1971, Representative Edith Green (D-Ore.) was reported in 
the Record 73 as having spoken out against a piece of labor legisla-
tion asserting that the new legislation would force the repeal of 
the Equal Pay for Equal Work Act. 74 The sponsor of the bill, 
Representative John N. Erlenborn (R-Ill.) made no response to 
this assertion.75 Officials of the Labor Department, relying on the 
Record, understood Erlenborn's silence to indicate that Green 
was right, and subsequently used their authority to oppose the 
proposed legislation.76 
In reality, Green was wrong.77 Erlenborn never had an oppor-
tunity to disagree with Green's assertion because her statement 
was never made in his presence nor during the course of the 
debate. 78 Representative Green, by exercising her revision privi-
lege, had simply inserted her comments in the Record after the 
floor debate had taken place.79 
The above examples of abuse are not isolated incidents. Rep-
resentative James G. O'Hara (D-Mich.), for example, explicitly 
admitted having made insertions in the Record bearing upon the 
intent of Congress in passing particular statutes.80 The revision 
privilege allows the insertion of statements that bear upon the 
issue of congressional intent but which were never heard in the 
debates when Congress agreed to a bill. As O'Hara noted, this 
privilege "makes possible a corruption of the legislative process 
72 125 CONGo REC. H4663 (daily ed. June 18, 1979). 
73 See 117 CONGo REC. 32, 42096 (1971). 
74 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1970). 
75 See 117 CONGo REC. 32, 42096 (1971). 




80 121 CONGo REC. 18, 22919 (1975). O'Hara believed that use of the revision privilege 
should be restricted. 
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and a misrepresentation of the legislative intent."81 Another rep-
resentative stated this observation in sharper terms: "Phony leg-
islative histories are written all the time ... [the inserted] words 
might push the [meaning] of [a] statute one way or the other, yet 
they had no influence whatever on debate or vote .... I have 
observed much skulduggery and the fraudulent making of legisla-
tive history by this means."82 
B. Thwarting The Purposes Of The Record 
As discussed previously, the Congressional Record serves both 
as an historical document and as a record of legislative intent. 
Abuse of the revision privilege may prevent the Congressional 
Record from fulfilling its major purposes. 
There are two primary justifications offered for the existence 
and use of the revision privilege. The first justification contends 
that the privilege is needed in order to correct typographical 
errors in the transcripts made by the official reporters,83 as well as 
to remove any grammatical errors84 and indecorous remarks 
made in the heat of debate.85 The second justification contends 
that the privilege to revise and extend is needed to afford mem-
bers of Congress an opportunity to put their viewpoints in print 
when time limitations prohibit them from verbally expressing 
their viewpoints during the floor debates.86 Alterations made in 
the Record under these two justifications, however, do not pro-
mote the Congressional Record's dual purpose as an historical 
document of congressional proceedings and as a record of legisla-
tive intent.87 
First, it is unnecessary for a member of Congress to proofread 
his own transcript for typographical errors. Congress employs 
81 Id. 
82 CLAPP, supra note 46 (remark by anonymous Republican). 
83 129 CONGo REC. S12400 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1983). 
B4 Mantel, supra note 44, at 984. 
85 Stevens, Inaccuracies in the Texts of Congressional Speeches, 15 CENT. STATES 
SPEECH J. 183, 186 (1964). For an historical example, see the remarks of Rep. Thomas E. 
Watson (D-Ga.) made in the House in 1892: "On the passage of the bill 113 Democrats 
voted against, 114 rascally Republicans voted for, and 13 leprous Greenbackers voted 
with the Republicans." Watson deleted these words from the verbatim transcript and 
denied ever making them. Id. 
86 Wall St. J., Mar. 31, 1975, Candor Has Its Limits, reprinted in 121 CONGo REC. 18, 
22902 (1975). 
87 Fernsworth, supra note 3. 
356 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [VoL 12:341 
proofreaders for this purpose.88 Second, while allowing members 
of Congress to correct grammatical errors made in debate may 
make the Record a tidier literary document,89 it may also help to 
obscure the Record's significance as an historical record. Future 
scholars may become puzzled why seemingly eloquent and power-
ful speeches went unnoticed by a speaker's contemporaries. The 
answer might be that the speech actually given was poorly or-
ganized or poorly delivered. Without some indication of substan-
tive alterations, historians will not be able to tell the difference. 
Third, allowing congressional members to delete indecorous re-
marks spoken during the debates may also cloud the historical 
value of the Record. Members of Congress are exempt from liabil-
ity for potentially libelous remarks they make during the de-
bates.911 This undoubtedly promotes some mudslinging and name 
calling that might prove embarrassing in print.91 However, inde-
corous remarks made in the de bates can be expunged from the 
Record by a majority vote of the body of Congress in which the 
remark is spoken.92 Thus, the revision privilege is not necessary in 
order to delete indecorous remarks from the Record. If the remark 
is not so repugnant that a majority will vote to delete it, the 
remark should remain in the Record as an important historical 
element of the debates.93 Historical knowledge of a single insult 
may go far in explaining the cooperation of certain participants in 
the debate. Indeed, it has been remarked that the inclusion of 
such remarks, as well as the inclusion of verbatim impromptu 
orations, may very well make the Record a more intriguing docu-
ment to study.94 
The second justification offered for the insertion of unspoken 
remarks into the Record is that the revision privilege is needed to 
88 Robinson, supra note 10, at 10. 
89 Mantel, supra note 44, at 986. 
90 Under the speech or debate clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6. 
91 104 CONGo REC. 6597 (1958)(remarks of Rep. McCormack) reprinted in Mantel, supra 
note 44, at 984. For example, in 1963, Rep. Cooley addressed Rep. Gross in the following 
manner: "You sit back here and snipe year after year. If you don't want to go why don't 
you just shut up?" The following day's Record quoted Mr. Cooley quite differently: "It is 
difficult for me to understand why you continue to complain." 
92 Stevens, supra note 85, at 186. 
93 Mantel, supra note 44, at 994, wrote: "Perpetual doctoring of the primary source of 
legislative activity is no solution to hasty thoughts and hot tempers." 
!J4 Sen. Neuberger (D-Ore.), The Congressional Record Is Not A Record, N.Y. Times, 
Apr. 20, 1958 (Magazine) reprinted in 132 CONGo REC. 26, 33519 (1977). ("Indeed, the 
inevitable added zest and controversy and slips and lapses could make the Record a far 
more lively and readable document."). 
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compensate for the time limitations inherent in the debates. It 
would be impractical for every member of Congress to express her 
view on every issue that comes before Congress.95 Permitting 
members of Congress to place their opinions "on record" by inser-
tion rather than by actual oral presentation undoubtedly helps to 
curb a good deal of unnecessary debate.96 
Inserted statements, however, may have a substantive impact 
on the interpretation given to a statute after its passage without 
ever having any influence on the debate or vote.97 If a statement 
of congressional intent on a particular statute goes unchallenged 
on the floor, it should be accorded more weight in establishing 
Congress' true legislative intent than a statement inserted in the 
Record after the debate when there is no opportunity for rebut-
tal. 98 Thus, unmarked insertions may carry more weight in dis-
cerning legislative intent than they should. The concern over 
unmarked insertions in the Record is particularly profound in 
those instances when a member of Congress makes a remark 
bearing on legislative intent during the floor debates when it may 
influence the deliberations or vote and subsequently uses her 
revision privilege to alter her statement to reflect a different 
intent before her remarks are printed in the Record. 99 
Thus, those who rely on the Congressional Record as evidence 
of legislative intent may be misled by unmarked inserted state-
ments or substantive alterations made under the revision privi-
lege. The debates as recorded in the Record are utilized both by 
federal agencies when drafting regulations and by the courts 
when interpreting federal statutes. 100 
The revision privilege presents a potential danger that regula-
95 See supra text and note at note 86. If, for example, all 435 members of the House of 
Representatives spoke for as short as one minute each on a single piece of legislation, the 
debate would last longer than seven hours. L.A. Times, Mar. 17, 1975, reprinted in 121 
CONGo REC. 18, 22903 (1975). 
96 However, Congressmen who want to be viewed as participants in the legislative 
debates should really be involved. 129 CONGo REC. S12403 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1983)(re-
marks of Sen. Mathias: "If the appearance is so important, let us use that as an incentive 
to bring about the reality."). 
97 See supra text and note at note 82. See N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n. Recommenda-
tions Approval (Report No. F-11 recommending approval of H. Res. 479), Nov. 1977, 
reprinted in 123 CONGo REC. 30, 38911 (1977) for a hypothetical of potential abuse in which 
the revision privilege might be psed by lobbyists as a method to influence the courts 
when interpreting a bill. 
98 Anderson Bros. v. Valencia, 452 U.S. 205, 232 n.10 (1981)(dissenting opinion). 
99 123 CONGo REC. 9, 10543 (1977)(remarks of Rep. Steiger). 
100 See supra text and notes at notes 30-40. 
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tions governing the implementation and enforcement of a federal 
statute will not effectuate the statute's true purpose. Federal 
agencies (such as the Environmental Protection Agency) often 
refer to the Congressional Record when drafting regulations for 
the administration of federal statutes.101 Indeed, some insertions 
are placed in the Record specifically to influence the drafting 
process.10'.! Therefore, an inaccurate Record could result in the 
promulgation of federal regulations which do not adequately re-
flect congressional intent. 
The reported debate on the ninety-eight billion dollar tax in-
crease passed by the House on August 19, 1982103 provides an 
example of this potential danger. The Congressional Record for 
that day contains seven pages of comments (roughly 10,000 words) 
allegedly spoken within a ten minute period.104 The great bulk of 
these comments could not have been spoken on the floor within 
that time. Nevertheless, none of these statements were marked 
with bullets to indicate that they were not actually spoken on the 
House floor. If the Internal Revenue Service refers to these in-
serted, unmarked statements when drafting regulations for the 
enforcement of this tax increase, it may improperly rely on 
statements that were not a part of the actual debate or vote. 
The revision privilege also creates a danger that the courts will 
misinterpret the intent of Congress when applying federal stat-
utes.105 The Congressional Record serves as a principal source for 
determining the legislative intent existing at the time a statute is 
passed. loo When questions arise as to the meaning of a federal 
statute, often both parties to the dispute will comb the Con-
gressional Record in search of remarks that will lend support to 
their positions in briefs and oral arguments presented to the 
courtS.107 These remarks may influence the decision of the court 
even when the court does not expressly rely on them in its opin-
ion. los 
101 124 CONGo REC. 4, 5110 (1978)(remarks of Rep. Steiger). 
102 [d. ("Prearranged colloquies between Members of the House or Senate are often 
used expressly for this purpose. When an unstated argument has been printed without 
rebuttal, legislative intent can be clouded forever.") 
103 128 CONGo REC. H6635 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1982). 
104 128 CONGo REC. H6614-22 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1982). See Miller, supra note 67, at 75. 
105 121 CONGo REC. 16, 21335 (1975)("[U]nless the Record shows debate on a measure 
exactly as it took place and identifies clearly the remarks actually spoken on the floor, 
there is a grave danger the courts will misinterpret the intent of Congress.") 
106 See supra text and notes at notes 41-43. 
107 Givens, supra note 34. 
108 [d. 
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The courts apparently rely on the Congressional Record as an 
indication of legislative intent when adjudicating controversies of 
environmental concern. Federal courts, for example, have cited 
the Record in decisions involving the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)l09 in at least 247 cases. uo Yet, there is no 
way to know how much of the supposed "debate" on NEPA re-
ported in the Congressional Record was actually spoken and how 
much was simply inserted after the true debate was over. 
C. The Role Of The Press 
It has been asserted, however, that Congress is not the body 
responsible for providing the public with an accurate account of 
the floor debates.1l1 Sen. Charles R. Mathias (R-Md.), former 
Chairman of the Joint Committee on Printing, suggests that a 
separate institution already exists for the purpose of informing 
the public about the conduct of its elected officials. 112 That institu-
tion is the press. Mathias asserts that the press, as the fourth 
estate of government,113 is the body responsible for insuring the 
veracity of congressional members.114 As part of its duty, the press 
should inform the public when these officials exceed the scope of 
acceptable typographical and grammatical editing and enter the 
dubious realm of substantive revision. 
While Sen. Mathias' press-as-watchdog theory is consistent with 
the concept of freedom of the press, it provides insufficient 
grounds for releasing Congress of its duty to provide an accurate 
report of its own proceedings. There are two basic weaknesses in 
Sen. Mathias' approach. First, Congress has imposed burdens on 
the press' ability to make comparisons between what is reported 
in the Record and what is actually spoken on the floors of Con-
gress. Tape recordings of the debates are not permitted.1l5 In 
109 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1976). 
llO LEXIS search using the keyword sequence: (National Environmental Policy Act or 
NEPA) and (Congressional Record or Congo Rec.). Search conducted on November 14, 
1984. 
III 129 CONGo REC. S12400-03 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1983)(statement of Sen. Mathias). 
ll2 [d. at S1240l. 
ll3 Justice Stewart stated that the "primary purpose of the constitutional guarantee of 
a free press was ... to create a fourth estate outside the Government as an additional 
check on the three official branches." Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634 
(1975). 
ll4 129 CONGo REC. S12401 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1983). 
ll5 Miller, supra note 67, at 76. 
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addition, the verbatim transcripts of the debates are classified as 
"non-public." 116 Accordingly, they are not available for scrutiny by 
either the public or the press. 117 
The press would be forced to undertake an extremely laborious 
process in order to adequately monitor the conduct of Con-
gressmen and the use of the revision privilege. In order to make 
comparisons between the Record and the actual proceedings, the 
press would be required to employ reporters to record verbatim 
every word spoken on the floors of the House and the Senate. This 
would be a clearly wasteful duplication of a task already per-
formed by Congress. The press would then have to compare its 
own transcripts against those which are printed in the Record in 
order to discover substantive discrepancies between the two. The 
press would also be faced with the arduous task of combing 
agency reports and court opinions to uncover instances of the 
material misuse of substantive revisions as indicators of con-
gressional intentYs 
This tedious scenario underscores the inadequacy of Sen. 
Mathias' suggestion that the press is well-suited for this monitor-
ing process. The burgeoning volume of government generated 
information makes it impracticable, if not impossible, for the press 
to keep a vigilant eye on all governmental activities,119 much less 
to perform duplicative tasks which should be unnecessary in the 
first place. If Congress simply printed accurate transcripts itself, 
or contracted out to the media to print accurate transcripts, there 
would be no need for the media to keep a watch for abuses of the 
revision privilege. 120 
116 I d. at 72. 
117 Id. at 76. According to Miller, only one outsider has ever been allowed to view the 
original transcripts-a researcher for columnist Jack Anderson. Id. Anderson's re-
searcher scrutinized only two days worth of transcripts, yet discovered some substantial 
changes made via the revision privilege. Id. at 73. When Miller asked why the original 
transcripts were "non-public," he was informed that the manuscripts "are the personal 
property of the members of Congress." Id. at 76. 
118 It should be recalled that the Record may be influential in these areas even when 
not expressly cited by agencies or the courts. See supra text at note 108. Thus, even this 
method would be insufficient to adequately monitor revisions made in the Record. 
119 Note, The First Amendment Right of Access to Government Held Information: A 
Reevaluation After Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 292, 294 
(1982). 
120 "Accurate" does not necessarily mean that the printed transcripts must be a 
verbatim account of the debates. Congress might simply employ an editing staff which 
would make certain that unmarked revisions are made solely for the purpose of correct-
ing grammatical and typographical errors. All substantive changes or additions should 
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Second, Congress originally adopted the Congressional Record 
in part to redress the inaccuracies attributable to the political 
biases of the original recorders of the debates. 121 Congress has 
assumed the role of the press in reporting its own debates. Con-
gress should also assume the media's role as a constitutionally' 
appointed means of scrutinizing the behavior of public officials in 
order to keep them accountable to their constituency. As Justice 
Stewart noted in Saxbe v. Washington Post CO.,122 "the press 
serves and was designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any 
abuses of power by governmental officials and as a constitution-
ally chosen means for keeping officials elected by the people re-
sponsible to all the people whom they were selected to serve." 123 To 
the extent that the Record displaces the role of the press, it must 
also assume responsibility for providing the public with "accurate 
information"124 in order to avoid diluting the public's right to 
"assert meaningful control over the political process."125 
D. What Should Be Done to Improve the Record's Accuracy 
Statements that are written and inserted in the Congressional 
Record, rather than delivered on the floor of Congress, merit little 
be clearly indicated-either by a more stringent application of the bulleting requirement 
or by some other publishing technique. 
m See supra text and notes at notes 17-24. 
122 417 U.S. 843 (1974). 
123 Id. at 863-64 quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966). 
124 Sax be, 417 U.S. at 863. 
125 Id. The Court stated that: 
An informed public depends on accurate and effective reporting by the news 
media. No individual can obtain for himself the information needed for the 
intelligent discharge of his political responsibilities .... In seeking out the news 
the press therefore acts as an agent of the public at large. It is the means by 
which the people receive that free flow of information and ideas essential to 
intelligent self-government. By enabling the public to assert meaningful control 
over the political process, the press performs a crucial function in effecting the 
societal purpose of the First Amendment. 
See the remarks of Rep. Kasten, Jr.: 
[C]urrent practice may contribute to inaccurate reporting in the press and 
media. Many members have complained about the manner in which the press 
reports congressional business. However, the present state of the Record forces 
Members and the public to rely upon press reports that may themselves be 
based upon incomplete information, in error, or partly the product of personal 
political preference of the writer. If the Congressional Record were a more 
accurate accounting of congressional debate and activity, I think this problem 
could be improved. 
121 CONGo REC. 16, 21335 (1975). 
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weight in the construction of legislative history.126 Thus, when 
inserted statements in the Record are not marked they will ap-
pear to have been spoken on the floor as part of the legislative 
process and may be given more weight in the interpretation of 
federal statutes than they deserve. This may lead to the misin-
terpretation of congressional intent. 
The Congressional Record provides an inaccurate report of the 
actual floor proceedings. The lax application and enforcement of 
the bulleting requirements presents a potential for abuse of the 
revision privilege by allowing unmarked substantive alterations 
of the floor debates before the debates are printed in the Record. 
Correction of typographical and grammatical errors and the re-
moval of indecorous remarks are in conflict with the utility of the 
Record as an historical document. Even if such corrections and 
deletions are justified, insertions and other changes are not in 
light of the Record's second purpose as a record of legislative 
intent. Abuse of the revision privilege may result in the im-
plementation of an inaccurate congressional intent by adminis-
trative agencies when relying on the Record in writing federal 
regulations or by the courts when relying on the Record when 
interpreting federal statutes. 
In order to eliminate the potential for abuse, Congress should 
severely restrict the scope of the revision privilege. This restric-
tion could be accomplished through the enactment of more strin-
gent requirements for identifying substantive alterations made in 
the transcripts of the debates. Ideally, inserted statements should 
be assigned to a separate index to make it clear that they were 
not spoken in the actual debates. If it is necessary to place inser-
tions in the main body of the Record for purposes of clarity or 
congruity, the inserted statements should be clearly marked. 
Substantive changes that may alter the meaning or interpreta-
tion of a speech should also be plainly marked. Insertions and 
substantive changes could be marked through a more stringent 
application of the bulleting requirement. By placing bullets 
around all inserted remarks and substantive alterations in the 
legislative debates, Congress would greatly enhance the accuracy 
of the Congressional Record and correspondingly increase the 
Record's value as both an historical document and as a record of 
congressional intent. 
126 Anderson Bros., 452 U.S. at 232 n.lO; see supra text and notes at notes 97-99. 
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VI. FIRST AMENDMENT GROUNDS FOR REQUIRING AN 
ACCURATE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD 
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If Congress refuses to restrict the use of the revision privilege, a 
challenge to the present privilege may find constitutional support 
in a judicial action based upon first amendment principles. 127 First 
amendment rights are traditionally applied in situations restrict-
ing freedom of religion, freedom of speech or freedom of assembly. 
However, courts have recognized several other distinct constitu-
tional rights stemming from the first amendment. Among these 
additional rights are the established right to receive information 
and the emerging right of public access to information within the 
government's control. The following sections will discuss the 
merits of asserting these two rights in an attempt to require 
127 The first amendment reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition 
the government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
A lawsuit seeking this declaration was filed by the Mountain States Legal Foundation 
in District of Columbia district court seeking an injunction directing the Government 
Printing Office to print a Congressional Record that is an accurate report of con-
gressional proceedings. See their Amended Complaint, Gregg v. Barret, D.C. District 
Court Civil Action No. 84-0204. The suit was filed on behalf of two classifications of 
plaintiffs: 1) on its own behalf and on the behalf of individually named attorneys on the 
basis that they are "officers of the court and advocates of the public interest, [and] have 
been and are thus obligated to represent to the courts that the Congressional Record 
may be relied upon in construing legislative intent .... "; and 2) on behalf of individually 
named Representatives in that they "have an interest in receiving such information 
from their fellow Congressmen, in having access to transcripts of congressional proceed-
ings ... and in preventing the defendant Public Printer from censoring or distorting 
communications that have actually occurred on the Senate floor, and from fabricating 
communications that did not occur." Congressional Record Case Proposal, Mountain 
States Legal Foundation, prepared by M. Miller, S. Bard, & M. Perna. 
The case was dismissed in trial court for lack of jurisdiction under invocation of the 
speech or debate clause of the U.S. Constitution. Gregg v. Barret, No. 84-0204, slip op. at 3 
(D.D.C. May 30, 1984). Discussion of the speech or debate clause is beyond the scope of the 
present article. It should be noted, however, that in situations involving two conflicting 
constitutional rights, i.e. those of the legislature embodied in the speech or debate clause 
and those of individuals embodied in the first amendment, the doctrine of separation of 
powers suggests that the court should exercise jurisdiction. Reinstein & Silverstein, 
Legislative Procedure and the Separation of Powers, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1175 (1973). 
To permit the invocation of the speech or debate clause to preclude judicial review of first 
amendment rights, the protection of which has always been the institutional responsibil-
ity of the judiciary, would elevate the legislative branch above the judicial branch in 
such situations. [d. Contra Eastland v. U.S. Serviceman's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 508 (1975) 
(four dissenting justices, however, stated that constitutional rights of individuals must 
sometimes take priority over the speech or debate clause.) The speech or debate clause 
was designed to make Congress a coequal rather than a supreme branch of government. 
United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 508 (1972). 
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Congress to print an accurate Cangressional Record.128 In addi-
tion, this article will propose an original theory based upon under-
lying first amendment principles for requiring an accurate Re-
cord, the concept of constitutionally imposed substantive lim-
itations on the government's authority to distort information that 
it voluntarily disseminates. 
A. The Constitutional Right To Receive Information 
The first amendment guarantees, with some qualifications, a 
constitutional right to send information unrestricted by govern-
ment interference. This right has long been recognized by the 
judicial system.129 Recently, the Supreme Court has held that the 
first amendment also contains a right to receive information un-
hampered by governmental restraints. Individuals with a specific 
interest in receiving an accurate record of congressional delibera-
tions might assert a right to receive this information unhampered 
by the distortion imposed upon the presentation of the floor de-
bates in the Congressional Record by members of Congress exer-
cising their revision privilege. l30 In order to determine the merits 
of such an assertion, it will be useful to examine the requisites 
necessary in order to maintain a right to receive. 
In Lamont v. Postmaster General,131 one of the first cases to 
recognize a right to receive, the Supreme Court reviewed the 
constitutionality of the Postal Service Act of 1962 which provided 
for the detainment of communist propaganda by the Postal Ser-
vice unless a written request for its delivery was made by the 
addressee. l32 The Court held that the statute constituted an un-
constitutional restriction on the addressee's first amendment 
rights.l33 As noted by Justice Brennan in his concurrence, it was 
not the right of the sender being recognized in this decision. 
128 The right to receive and the right of access were proposed as possible causes of 
action in the Congressional Record Case Proposal, supra note 127. Mountain States 
Legal Foundation decided not to pursue the right of access doctrine in their lawsuit. See 
Amended Complaint, supra note 127. 
129 See, e.g., Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927). 
130 See Amended Complaint, supra note 127. 
131 381 U.S. 301 (1965). 
132 The Act provided, in relevant part: "Mail matter, except sealed letters ... which is 
determined by the Secretary of the Treasury ... to be 'communist political propaganda,' 
shall be detained by the Postmaster General ... and the addressee shall be notified that 
such matter has been received and will be delivered only upon the addressee's request 
.... " Postal Service and Federal Employees Salary Act of 1962, 76 Stat. 840, § 305(a). 
133 Lamont, 381 U.S. at 307. 
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Rather, the holding was based on the right of the addressee to 
receive information freely offered to him without undue interfer-
ence on the part of the government. 134 
The constitutional right to receive information, however, is ac-
companied by certain restrictions. In Kleindienst v. Mandel,l35 the 
Supreme Court held that governmental interference with the free 
flow of information to willing recipients, although generally pro-
hibited, may be permissible in situations encompassing matters of 
traditional congressional authority. In Kleindienst, several uni-
versity professors brought an action to secure a visa for Ernest E. 
Mandel, a Marxian theoretician invited to the United States to 
address a conference on Technology and the Third World. 136 The 
government refused Mandel's visa under a federal statute which 
barred entry to the United States, at the discretion of the Attor-
ney General,137 to any person who advocated "the economic, inter-
national and governmental doctrines of world communism."138 
Several university professors asserted that the statute denied 
them their right to hear, or receive, Mandel's political teachings. 139 
While the Court acknowledged that the right to receive was well 
established,l40 it did not accept plaintiffs' argument that the right 
to receive required the Court to balance the government's deci-
sion to bar Mandel's entry to the country against the plaintiffs' 
asserted first amendment rightS. 141 The Court based its refusal on 
a finding that the statute was a legitimate exercise of a firmly 
established congressional power, the power to restrict travel to 
and from the United States. 142 
The case of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia 
County Consumer Councip43 presents a further limitation on the 
right to receive. In Virginia, consumers of prescription drugs 
134 Id. at 307-08 (concurring opinion). 
135 408 U.S. 753 (1972). 
136 Id. at 756-57. 
137 The Attorney General could waive ineligibility under § 212(d) of the Act. Id. at 
755-56. 
138 Id. at 755. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, §§ 212(a)(28)(D) and 
(G)(v). 
139 Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 760. 
140 Id. at 762. 
141 Id. at 765. 
142 Id. at 769-70. Justice Marshall would have applied a different constitutional stan-
dard.ld. at 777 (dissenting opinion)("It is established constitutional doctrine ... that the 
government may restrict First Amendment rights only if the restriction is necessary to 
further a compelling governmental interest."). 
143 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
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challenged a state statute's declaration that the advertisement of 
prescription drug prices by pharmacists constituted unprofes-
sional conduct. l44 Since only licensed pharmacists were permitted 
to dispense prescription drugs in Virginia, the statute effectively 
prohibited the affirmative dissemination of information pertain-
ing to the price of prescription drugs anywhere within the state. 145 
While the statute restricted the permissable conduct of pharma-
cists rather than of consumers, the Supreme Court nevertheless 
held that the consumers were entitled to redress under the first 
amendment since freedom of communication is a right that runs 
to the recipient of the communication as well as to the communi-
cation's source.146 The Court also noted, however, that the concept 
of freedom of speech presupposes a willing sender. 147 Without the 
willing sender requirement, the right to receive information 
would be paramount to a right to extract information from one 
who does not wish to send it. 148 Thus, the right to receive informa-
tion can only be asserted when the holder of the information is 
willing to send it. 
Considering the above limitations on the right to receive, it does 
not seem as if a right to receive could be successfully asserted in 
an action seeking to require the publication of an accurate Con-
gressional Record for two reasons. First, by permitting the exer-
cise of the revision privilege, Congress is simply asserting its 
power to control the contents of a document for whose publication 
it is solely responsible, a power which is part of Congress' tradi-
tional authority.149 Therefore, under Kliendienst, a court is un-
likely to find that the right to receive prohibits the present revi-
144 I d. at 749-50. 
145 I d. at 752. 
146 Id. at 756. The Court stated: "[i]f there is a right to advertise, there is a reciprocal 
right to receive the advertising, and it may be asserted by these [consumers]." Id. at 757. 
147 Id. at 756. The Court noted that a willing sender existed in the Virginia case: "In 
the absence of [the statute prohibiting advertising] some pharmacies in Virginia would 
advertise, publish and promote price information regarding prescription drugs." Id. at 
756 n.14 quoting Stipulation of Facts 26, App. 15. 
148 Note that the remedy in the Virginia case held that the statute prohibiting adver-
tising of prescription drug prices was unconstitutional. The Court did not hold, in any 
sense, that the consumers had a right to require pharmacists to advertise who did not 
wish to. 
149 The Congressional Record is printed under statutory authority. See supra note 6. 
While these statutes require the Record to be a "substantially verbatim report," supra 
note 1, it would be futile to attempt to restrict the behavior of Congress through a first 
amendment judicial declaration based on statutory language that Congress could 
change at will. 
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sion privilege. Second, the present revision privilege does not 
interfere with communicatIons between willing senders and will-
ing receivers. Although those members of Congress who wish to 
disseminate an unedited version of congressional deliberations 
may be classified as willing senders, their right to send informa-
tion, and the intended recipients' right to receive, is not presently 
being denied. Congress does not prohibit individual members of 
Congress from disseminating unedited information about legisla-
tive deliberations on their own time and at their own expense. It 
simply declines to fund such disseminations. Further, if con-
gressional members wish for an unedited version of their own 
remarks, the only statements of which they are the source, to 
appear unedited in the Congressional Record, they may fulfill this 
wish by declining to exercise their revision privilege. Those mem-
bers of Congress who choose to exercise their revision privilege 
clearly do not constitute willing senders under Virginia since they 
would rather disseminate a revised and extended version of their 
remarks than distribute the actual statements they made on the 
floor. Recipients of the revised statements could not compel them 
to do otherwise under the guise of a right to receive. 
It is arguable that remarks made by members of Congress 
cannot be considered in isolation, and that the unrestrained exer-
cise of the revision privilege by some members of Congress dis-
torts the context of the unaltered speeches disseminated by those 
congressional members who do constitute willing senders of their 
unedited remarks. The Record, however, is not intended to dis-
seminate the remarks of each Congressman individually; rather, 
it is intended to convey the statements of Congress as a whole. 
Therefore, Congress, as one entity, is the appropriate sender to be 
considered for purposes of satisfying the willing sender require-
ment outlined in Virginia and Congress as a whole has the right 
to control the content of the message it sends to the nation 
through the Congressional Record. 150 
150 Some confusion may result from the fact that both the sender and the governmen-
tal body allegedly interfering with the communication in this case are one and the same, 
namely, Congress. When there exist two clearly distinct private sources constituting the 
sender and the intended receiver of information, it is easy to discern when the govern-
ment is interfering with a free flow of information. However, when the government itself 
constitutes the sender, as in this case, it is difficult to discern which of the government's 
actions should be attributed to its role as sender and which should be attributed to its 
role as potential interferor. In the present case, the revision privilege allows Congress to 
exercise control over the materials it wishes to disseminate as sender. Congress merely 
permits its members to make revisions. It does not require revisions. Nor does it promote 
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B. The Constitutional Right Of Access To Information 
The right of access presents a substantially different first 
amendment challenge from the one presented by the right to 
receive. Instead of disputing the government's authority to inter-
fere with political communications, the right of access confronts 
the government's ability to restrict access to information within 
the government's control. It may be asserted that the revision 
privilege, by permitting the distortion of the floor debates before 
they are printed in the Record, denies access to governmental 
information. Since the scope of the emerging right of access is still 
uncertain, it will be instructive to consider the evolution of this 
right in some detail in order to determine if it could provide an 
effective limitation on the present revision privilege; 
In the case of Pell v. Procunier,151 four prison inmates and three 
professional journalists challenged a California regulation that 
prohibited the media from selecting specific inmates for inter-
views. l52 Three journalists were denied permission to interview 
specific inmates. l53 The plaintiffs, composed of both inmates and 
journalists, sued to enjoin subsequent enforcement of the regula-
tion. lM The journalists contended that the regulation unconstitu-
tionally infringed upon their ability to gather news. 155 
The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs did not have a valid 
first amendment claim,l56 noting specifically that the press had a 
right of access only to information available to the public in 
general,157 Justice Powell's dissent in the Pell opinion, however, 
foreshadowed the development of a first amendment right of 
revisions with any particular governmental policy in mind. The right to receive does not 
amount to a restriction on Congress' ability to control the information it wishes to 
disseminate as a willing sender. To hold otherwise would amount to recognizing a right 
to extract information that Congress is not willing to send. See supra text and notes at 
notes 147-48. 
Although the accuracy of information disseminated in the Congressional Record may 
not be successfully challenged under a right to receive, other first amendment principles 
may restrict Congress' ability to substantively distort the accuracy of information it 
voluntarily disseminates. See infra text and notes at notes 214-226. 
151 417 U.S. 817 (1974). 
152 Section 415.071 of the California Department of Corrections Manual provided: 
"[p]ress and other news media interviews with specific individual inmates will not be 
permitted." Pell, 417 U.S. at 819. 
153 [d. at 820. 
154 [d. 
155 [d. at 821. 
156 [d. at 835. 
157 [d. at 834. 
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access. Powell concluded that prohibiting the press from conduct-
ing interviews with prisoners prevented it from fulfilling its con-
stitutionally appointed role of informing people about the conduct 
of their government. 158 
The Supreme Court reached a similar decision in the companion 
case of Saxbe v. Washington. 159 Saxbe involved a challenge by a 
major newspaper to a Federal Bureau of Prisons regulation 1oo 
comparable to the California regulation in Pell. Like the Pell 
plaintiffs, the plaintiff in Saxbe argued that the regulation uncon-
stitutionally infringed upon its ability to gather newsworthy in-
formation. 161 The Court noted that although the federal regula-
tion prohibited the media from selecting specific inmates for in-
terviews, members of the press were free to visit any of their 
friends and family members who were inmates, to tour and 
photograph prison facilities, to interview briefly prisoners whom 
they encountered during prison tours, and to write and receive 
letters to and from prisoners. l62 In addition, the Court noted that 
because of the high level of inmate turnover, ex-prisoners were 
always available to answer questions about the conditions in 
federal prisons. l63 Based upon these observations, the Court con-
cluded that the prison regulation at issue in Saxbe was not in-
tended to conceal federal prison conditions from the public.l64 The 
Court therefore found Pell to be controlling and held that the 
press should be afforded no greater right of access to governmen-
tally held information than the public in general. l65 
Justice Powell's dissent again laid the groundwork for the de-
velopment of a right of access. 166 Although he acknowledged that 
158 Id. at 835. (Justice Powell, concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also the 
remarks of Justice Douglas: "The right to know is crucial to the governing powers of the 
people." Id. at 840 quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 721 (1972) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting). 
159 417 U.S. 843 (1974). 
160 Paragraph 4b(6) of Policy Statement 1220.1A of the Federal Bureau of Prisons 
stated, in relevant part: "Press representatives will not be permitted to interview 
inmates ... [except] with inmates whose identity is not to be made public, ifit is limited to 
the discussion of institutional facilities, programs and activities." Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 844 
n.1. 
161 I d. at 844-45. 
162 Id. at 846-47. Similar visitation privileges existed in Pell, 417 U.S. at 824-25. 
163 Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 848. 
164 Id. 
165 I d. at 850. 
166 Id. Justice Powell's dissent was joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, two of the 
other three dissenting voices in Pell. 
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the government need not under all circumstances be forced to 
justify restrictions on access to information within its control, 
Justice Powell rejected the notion that all restrictions on media 
access to government information were free from constitutional 
review. 167 He asserted that restraints on the ability of the press to 
gather news must be justified on stronger grounds then simple 
governmental deference, even when such restraints are applied 
equally against the press and the public. l68 According to Justice 
Powell, the majority focused only on the well-established rights 
explicitly expressed in the first amendment and thereby avoided 
considering the adverse impact that a restriction on the media's 
access to information, although applied equally to the press and 
the public, has upon underlying first amendment values. 1OO 
Justice Powell further asserted that the Court "must look be-
hind bright-line generalities . . . and seek the meaning of first 
amendment guarantees in light of the underlying realities of a 
particular environment."17o Thus, by insisting that the press has a 
need to accumulate information in order to perform its first 
amendment role, Justice Powell created the framework for ajudi~ 
cial theory of a constitutionally based right of access to govern-
mentally held information. 
The likelihood that the Court would adopt Justice Powell's ar-
gument for recognizing a first amendment right of access was 
seriously diminished, however, in the subsequent case of 
Houchins v. KQED.l7l In Houchins, a broadcasting company 
sought access to the wing of a county jail where an inmate had 
committed suicide.172 The conditions of the jail allegedly contrib-
uted to the inmate's suicidal depression. l73 At the time the 
Houchins case was brought, no public tours of the prison facilities 
were conducted, the inmates' mail· was censored, and no inter-
167 [d. at 861. 
168 [d. Justice Powell wrote: 
At some point official restraints on access to news sources, even though not 
directed solely at the press, may so undermine the function of the First 
Amendment that it is both appropriate and necessary to require the govern-
ment to justify such regulations in terms more compelling than discretionary 
authority and administrative convenience. It is worth repeating our admonition 
in Branzburg that "without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom 
of the press could be eviscerated." 
169 [d. at 875. 
170 [d. 
171 438 U.S. 1 (1978). 
172 [d. at 3. 
173 [d. 
1985] CONGRESSIONAL RECORD 371 
views with inmates were permitted of any kind. 174 The plaintiff, 
KQED, asserted that the county's failure to provide alternative 
means by which the public could be informed about the conditions 
of the jail violated the first amendment. 175 
The plurality opinion, authored by Chief Justice Burger, accu-
rately noted that the Supreme Court, in Pell and Saxbe, had 
rejected a special right of access for the press beyond that af-
forded to the public in general. I76 The Houchins opinion, however, 
went beyond these holdings to decide that there was no discern-
ible basis for a constitutionally imposed governmental duty to 
disclose newsworthy information.177 The plurality opinion con-
cluded that the first amendment did not mandate a right of access 
to information within the government's control.l78 
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Powell, dis-
sented. While agreeing with the plurality that the press had no 
right of access beyond that held by the public in general, Justice 
Stevens noted that the Court had never before held that all 
nondiscriminatory exclusions of both the press and the public 
from access to information would avoid constitutional scrutiny.179 
The dissent noted that "[w]ithout some protection for the acquisi-
tion of information about the operation of public institutions such 
as prisons by the public at large, the process of self-governance 
contemplated by the Framers would be stripped of its sub-
stance."Hll The dissent would have held that a right of access to 
information exists in favor of both the press and the public under 
the appropriate circumstances. 181 Justice Stevens, however, did 
not attempt to define the scope of such a right of access. 
A limited right of access to governmentally held information 
was finally recognized by a majority of the Supreme Court in the 
case of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia. 182 Although the 
right of access recognized in Richmond was limited to a right to 
attend criminal trials,183 the Richmond holding represents a clear 
deviation from the flat rejection of a first amendment right of 
174 [d. at 22-23. Cf the facts in Pell and Saxbe, supra text and note at note 162. 
175 Houchins, 438 U.S. at 4. 
176 [d. at 11. 
177 [d. at 14. 
178 [d. at 15. 
179 [d. at 27. 
ISO [d. at 32. 
181 [d. 
182 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
183 [d. at 580. 
372 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 12:341 
access presented in Houchins. In Richmond, the trial court or-
dered a murder trial closed to the press and public. 184 The plaintiff, 
Richmond Newspapers, argued that the trial court could not 
order closure of the courtroom without first holding evidentiary 
hearings to decide if less restrictive alternative means could be 
used to protect the rights of the defendant. 185 
The plurality opinion, authored by Chief Justice Burger, held 
that the trial court, under the facts of the case, had unjustifiably 
closed its proceedings to the press and the public in violation of 
their first amendment rights. 186 Explaining the Court's holding, 
Chief Justice Burger primarily emphasized the historical tradi-
tion of openness attending criminal trial proceedings. m Although 
the plurality opinion in the earlier Houchins decision precluded a 
first amendment right of access,t!*l Chief Justice Burger was ap-
parently compelled to rely on the first rather than the sixth 
amendment in Richmond due to the Supreme Court's rejection of 
a sixth amendment right to compel a public trial in an earlier 
case.l~9 
Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion, described Richmond as 
a watershed casel90 and highlighted Richmond's right of access 
component. 191 He noted that the Supreme Court had never before 
squarely held that the acquisition of newsworthy material was 
entitled to constitutional protection. 192 Stevens applauded the 
plurality for recognizing that the first amendment protected the 
public and press from infringement of their rights of access to 
information ~oncerning the operation of their government. l93 
Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice Mar-
shall, espoused a right of access measured by weighing the pub-
lic's need for the desired information against the government's 
interests in preventing the information from being revealed. 194 
Justice Brennan further suggested that the Court should pay 
184 Id. at 560. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. at 580. 
187 Id. at 564-74. The Court also emphasized that courtroom proceedings were open to 
the public at the time the first amendment was adopted. Id. at 575. 
188 See supra text and notes at notes 177-78. The specific holding in Houchins, denying 
a right of access to prison facilities, may not be overruled by Richmond" 
189 Richmond, 448 U.S. at 581-82 (Justice White, concurring). The earlier case was 
Gannet Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979). 
100 Richmond, 448 U.S. at 582. 
191 Id. at 584. 
192 Id. at 582. 
193 I d. at 584. 
194 Id. at 588. 
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special attention to two specific guidelines in weighing these 
interests. First, the Court should consider whether the particular 
governmental institution to which access is sought is traditionally 
an open one. l95 If so, the institution's history of openness gives rise 
to a presumptive right of access. l96 Second, the Court should con-
sider whether access to the governmental process in question is 
important in promoting the goals of that very process. l97 If so, 
then enforcing a right of access to that process furthers underly-
ing first amendment goals. 198 
Justice Brennan's guidelines were adopted in 1982 by the ma-
jority opinion in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court. 199 In 
Globe, a newspaper challenged a trial judge's order closing a 
criminal trial from the press and the public.200 The trial involved 
alleged sexual offenses committed against three minors.201 The 
trial judge ordered closure of the trial to spectators as required by 
a Massachusetts statute.202 
The majority opinion held that the closure violated the press' 
and the public's first amendment right of access to criminal 
trials.203 In so holding, the majority first noted that criminal trials 
were traditionally open to the public.204 The Court further noted 
that the right to attend criminal trials plays an important role in 
the functioning of the judiciary and the government as a whole.205 
The majority opinion in Globe placed special emphasis on the 
second of these considerations, in contrast to the majority opinion 
in Richmond200 which placed primary emphasis on the first. The 
Globe majority emphasized the important functions performed by 
a right of access in the criminal justice system, stating: "in the 




199 457 U.S. 596 (1982). 
200 Id. at 598. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. The statute was MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 278, § 16A (West). ("At the trial of a 
complaint or indictment for rape ... where a minor under eighteen years of age is the 
person upon, with or against whom the crime is alleged to have been committed, ... the 
presiding judge shall exclude the general public from the courtroom, admitting only such 
persons as may have a direct interest in the case."). 
203 Globe, 457 U.S. at 602. 
204 Id. at 605. 
205 Id. at 606. ("Public scrutiny of a criminal trial enhances the quality and safeguards 
the integrity of the factfinding process, with benefits to both the defendant and to society 
as a whole.") See also infra text at note 207. 
208 See supra text at note 187. 
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broadest terms, public access to criminal trials permits the public 
to participate in and serve as a check upon the judicial process-
an essential component in our structure of self-government."207 
Globe represents a significant expansion in the area of the first 
amendment right of access. The Globe opinion stated that the first 
amendment encompasses all those rights necessary to enjoy 
other first amendment rights.208 By protecting the free and open 
discussion of governmental affairs, "the First Amendment serves 
to ensure the individual citizen can effectively participate in and 
contribute to our republican system of self-government."209 This 
function of the first amendment may imply a right of access to 
governmental institutions in addition to the courtroom. The Su-
preme Court, however, has yet to apply the right of access doc-
trine to other governmental institutions.210 
Even if the right of access doctrine is extended beyond a right to 
attend criminal trials to include access to other governmentally 
held information, it is highly unlikely that the Supreme Court 
would interpret this right to require Congress to print an accu-
rate account of the floor proceedings in the Congressional Record. 
In the criminal trial cases, in which a right of access was success-
fully asserted, attendance in the courtroom had been denied to 
both the press and the public. The floor debates in the House and 
the Senate, however, are already open to attendance by the press 
and the public.2l1 Therefore, "access" to the congressional debates 
is not being denied. The press in particular is free to attend and 
take notes on the debates. This is the same degree of attendance 
held to be constitutionally required by the first amendment in the 
criminal trial cases. 
207 457 U.S. at 606. 
208 Id. at 604. ("The First Amendment is thus broad enough to encompass those rights 
that, while not unambiguously enumerated in the very terms of the Amendment, are 
nonetheless necessary to the enjoyment of other First Amendment rights.") 
209 Id. 
210 At least three justices would limit the Richmond and Globe decisions to criminal 
trials only. Justice Rehnquist never recognized a right of access. Chief Justice Burger 
would limit a right of access strictly to proceedings involving an "unbroken, uncon-
tradicted history" of openness. Globe, 457 U.S. at 614. Justice O'Connor expressly limited 
her concurrence in Globe to criminal trials. Id. at 611. 
211 Except when there is a need for secret proceedings, e.g., on matters involving 
national security. 
The House allowed the public to attend its proceedings from 1789 and the Senate 
allowed public attendance from 1794. The press was not allowed to attend until 1801. 
O'Brien, The First Amendment and the Public's Right to Know, 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
579, 596 (1980). 
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One who has a pressing reason to obtain an accurate account of 
a floor debate, however, may not be able to do so after the debate 
is over. Only members of Congress are presently permitted to 
view the verbatim transcripts of the qebates. Since the govern-
ment possesses transcripts of the floor debates, requiring the 
public or press to attend debates in order to procure accurate 
legislative history may still amount to an unconstitutional in-
fringement of the right of access. 
The statement of this problem, however, also points out the 
limits of the problem's proper solution. Even if the Court were to 
find that the right of access doctrine applies to the Record's tran~ 
scripts, Congress would not be required to print an accurate ac-
count of the legislative proceedings in the Record. At best, "ac-
cess" in this situation would require Congress to provide access to 
the verbatim transcripts of the floor debates.212 
Even in the very unlikely event that the Court would compel 
Congress, based on a right of access, to print the entire verbatim 
transcripts of the debates in the Congressional Record, such a 
requirement would not restrain Congress from printing addi-
tional inserted remarks in the Record intermingled with the ver-
batim account. Congress would only be prohibited from deleting 
remarks actually spoken on the floor.213 
The insertion of remarks into the Record is of primary concern 
in the distortion of legislative history. For this reason, a judicial 
declaration of a right of access to the verbatim transcripts would 
be of greater utility, for the sake of establishing the actual pro-
ceedings of Congress, than a declaration requiring Congress to 
print a full account of the debates in the Record. The most valu-
212 Note that this would be a commendable achievement in itself. If the press were 
permitted to check the Congressional Record against the original transcripts, and to 
report the substance of changes made under the revision privilege, a large proportion of 
questionable revisions would likely be eliminated for fear of exposure. Of course, such a 
remedy is still a far cry from the one most desired-an accurate Record. Individuals with 
a need to check the accuracy of the Record would be forced to travel to the District of 
Columbia, petition to see the transcripts and then comb the transcripts to make com-
parisons. This process would be unnecessarily wasteful in view of the simple solution 
that could be enacted by Congress: the bulleting of all insertions of a substantive nature. 
213 It might be argued that the insertion of remarks would confuse valuable informa-
tion regarding what was actually said on the floors of Congress by changing the context 
of those retnarks actually delivered. However, this is more appropriately labeled as a 
distortion of information supplied by the government rather than a refusal of access to 
information under the government's control. The legal argument against governmental 
distortion of information which it voluntarily disseminates is considered infra in text 
and notes at notes 214-26. 
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able result of all, a requirement that the Record present an accu-
rate account of the floor proceedings, could not be asserted 
through the application of a right of access doctrine. 
C. First Amendment Limitations on the Government's Authority 
to Distort Information 
Although constitutional arguments for an accurate Con-
gressional Record do not fall neatly into recognized first amend-
ment rights, central first amendment principles still provide 
grounds for limiting the present scope of the revision privilege. 
The following discussion presents a theoretical framework, based 
upon underlying first amendment values, for prohibiting the gov-
ernment from distorting information that it voluntarily dissemi-
nates to the extent that such information reflects upon the gov-
ernment's official actions and proceedings. 
The freedoms which are expressly stated in the first amend-
ment share a common purpose of guaranteeing freedom of 
thought and communication on issues relating to the functioning 
of government.214 This central purpose is meant to "ensure that 
the individual citizen can effectively participate in and contribute 
to our republican system of self-government."215 
Citizen participation in a republican government is exercised 
primarily through the election of public representatives. Profes-
sor Alexander Meiklejohn, in his seminal work on the first 
amendment, stated that public officials are agents of the people 
who elected them.216 While it has been asserted that Meiklejohn's 
theory of citizen participation in government over-emphasizes 
the democratic ideal,217 even Meiklejohn's critics recognize that it 
is through the electoral process that citizens influence the direc-
tion of governmental policy.218 Thus, elected officials must be held 
accountable to the people who elected them. If they do not ade-
214 Globe, 457 U.S. at 604 quoting Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 
(1980). 
215 Globe, 457 U.S. at 604. 
216 A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GoVERNMENT, 252-55 
(1948). 
217 See, e.g., BeVier, An Informed Public, an Informing Press: The Search for a Con-
stitutional Principle, 68 CAL. L. REV. 482, 503-06 (1980). 
218 Id. Underlying this analysis is the fundamental assumption that the executive and 
legislative branches of our government operate under the consent of the people. Note, 
supra note 119, at 293. Citizens maintain their combined voice in determining the path of 
governmental policy through the electoral process. 
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quately represent the political and social interests of those who 
elected them, then their constituency retains the combined right 
to remove them from office at subsequent elections and to replace 
them with persons who will conduct their activities as true "rep-
resentatives." 
It is apparent, therefore, that in order for the electoral process 
to achieve its intended purpose of representing the interests of 
the citizenry, the voting public must be capable of making in-
formed assessments of their representatives' professional perfor-
mance.219 In order to pass judgements upon the decisions of 
elected officials, the public must be informed of what those deci-
sions are and how they are made.220 If the public is supplied with 
inaccurate information about the conduct of its representatives, 
then the right of the public to meaningfully participate in gov-
ernmental policy through the electoral process is vitiated. If there 
is no accountability, then the power of government rests solely 
within its own institutional branches rather than with the na-
tion's people.:!21 
In order for the first amendment to carry out its central pur-
pose, the amendment gives rise to several implicit guarantees.2:!2 
Enforcement of these implicit guarantees is as essential to pro-
219 "[Tlhe people who govern, must try to understand the issues which, incident by 
incident, face the nation. We must pass judgements upon the decisions which our agents 
make upon those issues." MEIKLEJOHN, supm note 216, at 255. Meiklejohn continued: 
"And further, we must share in devising methods by which those decisions can be made 
wise and effective or, if need be, supplanted by others which promise greater wisdom and 
effectiveness." Id. 
220 Appreciation by the legislature of the need of the public to be informed of public 
information has been manifested in the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, 
which mandates access to agency documents, with certain restrictions. Congress, how-
ever, specifically exempted itself from the Act's coverage. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1)(A)(1982). See 
also the "Declaration of Policy and Statement of Purpose" of the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 
552b (1982), stating, in part: "It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States 
that the public is entitled to the fullest practicable information regarding the decision-
making processes of the Federal Government." Pub. L. No. 94-409, § 2, 90 Stat. 1241 
(1976). 
221 Note, supra note 119, at 294. "In a world where control of knowledge is power, the 
withholding of information may keep an undeserving bureaucrat in office or gain the ear 
and attention of the public." Id. at 300. 
"2 "[Sjpecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations 
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance." Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965)(Justice Douglas). 
In Globe, the Supreme Court held that the first amendment is "broad enough to 
encompass those rights that, while not unambiguously enumerated in the very terms of 
the amendment, are nonetheless necessary to the enjoyment of other First Amendment 
rights." 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982). 
378 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [VoL 12:341 
moting first amendment values as is enforcement of those guaran-
tees expressly enumerated in the amendment. In order to ensure 
meaningful citizen participation in government, the first amend-
ment implicitly restricts the government's ability to disseminate 
misinformation about governmental processes.223 The first 
amendment should thus be interpreted to impose substantive 
limitations upon the government's ability to distort information 
that reflects upon the official conduct of elected officials or upon 
the mechanics of governmental procedures.224 
The current revision privilege exceeds this first amendment 
limitation by providing a mechanism for the distortion of informa-
tion concerning congressional proceedings. The net effect of this 
misrepresentation denies voters the opportunity to evaluate the 
professional performance of their elected officials in the con-
gressional debates. The revision privilege makes it impossible for 
the reader of the Congressional Record to appraise the talents of 
individual congressional members.225 Instead, the reader of the 
Record is exposed to rewritten speeches, inserted afterthoughts, 
and the creative rewriting of protective congressional staffs. An 
element of a representative's accountability to his constituency is 
there by lost.226 
223 See the case of Tarleton v. Sax be , in which a lower court held that the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation has a duty to prevent the dissemination of inaccurate arrest 
and conviction records. 507 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1974). To allow the government to collect 
and disseminate such inaccurate information, the court held, could induce a leveling 
conformity inconsistent with the diversity of ideas legally protected by the first amend-
ment. Id. See Congressional Record Case Proposal, supra note 127, at 19. 
'24 Note that this limitation does not require the government to disseminate informa-
tion. If the government voluntarily selects to disseminate information, however, then 
first amendment principles prohibit the government from distorting the accuracy of the 
disseminated information. 
225 This article does not assert that one's performance in the floor debates is the only, 
or even the most important, attribute of a competent member of Congress. Performance 
in the floor debates is, however, a valid factor to be taken into account by a member of 
Congress' constituency when determining the member's political future. Floor debates 
should therefore be reported, if at all, honestly and accurately, just as should other 
aspects of a congressional member's professional performance. 
226 According to former Senator Neuberger, the revision privilege amounts to "nothing 
less than deception of the folk who see the Record back home." 121 CONGo REC. 17, 22712 
(1975). 
In 1821, Jefferson Davis on the same subject said: "I am willing that my own remarks 
should stand and be published as they are taken by the reporters ... in order that there 
may be a fairness in the record, fairness in the representation as it goes out to the 
country." CONGo GLOBE, 31st Cong., 2d Sess. 596. 
While it is undoubtedly true that only a small percentage of the voting public actually 
reads the Congressional Record, information disseminated in the Record reaches the 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The Congressional Record does not provide an accurate report 
of the legislative debates. The inaccuracy of the Record resulting 
from the revision privilege that allows members of Congress to 
revise and extend their spoken remarks before they are published 
may substantively distort the implementation of federal law by 
administrative agencies and by the courts, both of which rely on 
the Record as a valid indication of congressional intent. In addi-
tion, the potential for members of Congress to substantively mis-
represent to their constituency what actually transpires during 
legislative proceedings violates the first amendment's central 
purpose of insuring that the public remains informed about the 
activities of its government. 
The Congressional Record should be set straight. Congress 
should apply the presently ineffective bulleting requirement more 
stringently in order to effectively identify all substantive addi-
tions to and alterations of the Record made under the revision 
privilege. If Congress refuses to restore the accuracy of the Rec-
ord on its own, it may be possible to seek a judicial declaration 
requiring an accurate Record under the implicit first amendment 
guarantees of meaningful citizen participation in government. At 
the very least, it should be known to the public and to the courts 
that the Congressional Record should not be relied upon as an 
accurate record of what the legislature actually said and heard. 
public through various means. Remarks made in the Record are scrutinized by lobbyists, 
special interest groups, candidates for office, and journalists who report on the activities 
of congressional members directly to the public. These uses go to the very heart of an 
elected official's accountability to her constituency. 
